Sunday, August 30, 2015

China’s problem is the economy itself, not the market sell-off – Financial Times

A targeted pinprick approach is needed, not a vast stimulus, writes David Daokui Li

Higher living standards: given a little more disposable income, the Chinese are willing to spend©Getty

Higher living standards: given a little more disposable income, the Chinese are willing to spend

The stock market sell-off is not the problem. Yes, the Shanghai Composite Stock Index has dropped almost 40 per cent since its June peak, but the Chinese economy has rarely been upset by fluctuations of its financial markets. The problem — not a huge one, but a problem nonetheless — is the Chinese economy itself. It requires corrective action from Chinese authorities — not surgery, but acupuncture.

It is easy to see why markets are unnerved. Trade and exports barely grew in the first half of this year, and in July exports fell significantly. Production of electricity and cement, both of which are consumed locally rather than exported, declined for the first seven months of the year. These signs indicate that the economy is slowing down.

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Last month, after months of market pressure, the People's Bank of China introduced a new mechanism for trading the renminbi, which caused its value to fall and triggered worldwide speculation of further devaluation. Yet this will not help China as much as one might expect. Other countries have also devalued, mitigating any potential benefits to Chinese exporters.

None of this augurs well for the government's chances of increasing output per head by 60 per cent by 2021. And China's economic hiccup is echoing around the world as never before. Share prices from New York to Moscow followed the country down last week, only to bounce back after the PBoC cut interest rates. Developments in China move commodities markets, too.

This is not a beautiful picture for Beijing's top decision makers, who must also contend with a rate cut expected this year from the US Federal Reserve. But the situation is not grave. Chinese consumers are still hungry for higher living standards, and given a little more disposable income, they are willing to spend. This is not mere speculation; my research has shown that as labour shortages have led to higher wages for blue-collar workers, private consumption has risen as a share of gross domestic product. If the Chinese cared only about economic security they would have squirrelled the money away.

What China needs is not a vast stimulus like that of 2009, which amounted to 7.5 per cent of GDP then (roughly the trade surplus) and encompassed huge infrastructure projects. It needs a pinprick stimulus targeted at the financial sector. Households and businesses pay some of the world's highest financing costs — which is ridiculous given the extraordinarily high savings rates.

The first element of the acupuncture stimulus is to cut interest rates, allow local governments to borrow for longer periods on the bond markets, and let banks lend more for a given amount of capital. The second is to enable this money to flow into infrastructure investments more quickly, by speeding up the process of land acquisition and implementing engineering blueprints. Local officials often avoid making decisions for fear that they will be accused of corruption. The fears of the upright and hard working must be dispelled.

The third "needle" is to encourage private enterprise, by lowering tax rates and implementing the already announced reform of selling off parts of state-owned enterprises to private investors. Outside managers should be brought in on market terms, and allowed much greater autonomy.

Many Chinese citizens have criticised the previous government's Rmb4tn stimulus package, taking to social media to argue that it did more to save the economies of the west than to benefit China. Academic economists, too, have been sceptical. Their negative memories of the central planning years led to their embrace of neoclassical economic thought, placing more faith in markets than government action.

But inactivity on the part of the government would be a grave mistake. The current situation differs from that of the past few years. China's financial market sell-off is having such a wide global impact. It may well be exacerbated by the actions of the Fed. In these circumstances, voices of concern must be set aside — and I believe they will be.

The writer is a former member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the People's Bank of China

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